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Comments on Professor Rotunda's
Essay
By RIcARD H. UNDERWOOD*
Why have a discussion of impeachment and judicial discipline? Is the discussion timely 9 I believe it is. The subject of
impeachment is at least as worthy of our attention as the date
of Pat Robertson's marriage. In terms of current events, we
have the case of Judge Harry Claiborne of the District of Nevada; he has now been impeached but should not be disbarred
according to the highest court in Nevada.' While I must admit
that I do not want to get too much at odds with our Kentucky
Senator, 2 I am not totally out of sorts because the Senate Judiciary Committee had a say in the recent Supreme Court appointment process of Judge Robert Bork. Whatever one thinks about
the Committee's role, the process was educational, and it ties
into our present discussion. The fact that the hearings were
educational is apparent. When I try to have a discussion with
an insurance agent or adjuster, he or she will inevitably support
his or her position with constitutional precedent. I trace this
constitutional awareness directly to the hearings.
Although I have not cracked the constitutional law books
for a long time, even I could follow the arguments in the Bork
hearings. I remembered the cases. Indeed, I followed the discussions at least as well as Senator Kennedy Moreover, my efforts
to bone up on the law of impeachment reaffirmed my belief
* Associate Professor of Law, Umversity of Kentucky, B.A., Ohio State Umversity, 1969; J.D., Ohio State Umversity, 1976. Chairman, Ethics Committee of the
Kentucky Bar Association. This is a revised version of remarks given at the Kentucky Law
Journal'sSymposium on Judicial Discipline and Impeachment, October 12, 1987, and is

not a pronouncement of the Ethics Committee of the Kentucky Bar Association.
I See McConnell, Reflections on the Senate's Role in the Impeachment Processand
Proposalsfor Change, 76 Ky. L.J. 739, 739-40 (1987-88).
2

Dunng his remarks at this Symposium, Sen. Mitch McConnell argued that

the Senate Judiciary Committee politicized the confirmation hearings of Supreme Court
nominee Judge Robert Bork.
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that discerning original intent is difficult. It is an exercise in
futility-sort of a long range psychoanalysis.
Professor Rotunda addresses the classic questions of impeachment law in An Essay on The ConstitutionalParameters
of Federal Impeachment. His Essay is a thorough discussion of
the major issues. Of particular interest is his short brief against
judicial review, which diverges from Raoul Berger's views, as I
understand them. I think Professor Rotunda has the better argument.
As the proverbial "Bat Boy at the World Series," I can do
little more than confirm his views based on my review of the
available authorities. For further reading, I would recommend
Impeachment by Raoul Berger I Impeachment in America, 16351805 by Hoffer and Hull is also a very interesting book for latenight reading when there is nothing good on HBO4 Also, I
found useful a very old but very short book by Alexander
Simpson, a Philadelphia trial lawyer.5 He said much of what
Berger said in fewer pages and in words of one syllable or less.
As I recall, he worked on some aspect of Judge Archbald's
impeachment, which occurred before World War 1.6
Turning to the merits of Professor Rotunda's Essay, I have
to support the view that the phrase "high Crimes and
Misdemeanors ' 7 allows for impeachment for noncriminal acts.
Of course, when someone is faced with impeachment, he or she
will come up with the "plain English" and contrary argument.
It has certainly been raised enough times in the House and in
the Senate at the "trial" stage. It has always been rejected,
however, as far as I can tell. The phrase appears in the English
documents called something like "articles or bills of impeachment." An examination of these sources reveals many successful
pleas for impeachment that involved noncriminal conduct.
Furthermore, Hoffer and Hull provide considerable evidence
that the framers were at least as familiar with colonial and state
impeachment precedents as they were with the older "British"

R. BERGER, IMPEACHMENT: THE CONSnTUTION PROBLEMS (1973).
P HOMPR & N. HULL, IMPEACHMENT iN AMERICA, 1635-1805 (1984).
A. SR&PSON, A TREATISE ON FEDERAL IMPEACHMENTS (1916).

See Judge Archbald's Conviction, 1 Ky. L.J. 15 (1913).
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.
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cases. The framers had arrived at something of a consensus,
wherein they were defining impeachment "for cause" that involved "willful" or "corrupt" conduct. Nevertheless, their definition of impeachment extended to noncrimnal conduct. If we
credit the evidence tendered by Hoffer and Hull, many of the
framers were impeachment lawyers in the sense that they had
participated in impeachments, or something like impeachments,
at the state level.'
I also agree with Professor Rotunda that Madison's request
to substitute the familiar "high Crimes and Misdemeanors" 9 for
Mason's "maladministration" was acceptable because both
framers were basically on the same wavelength. Perhaps Mason's choice of words was a bit overbroad: "maladministration"
might have been interpreted to have a meaning that the framers
did not want, such as impeachment for "bad advice." "Bad
advice" impeachment had some support in England; however,
the framers did not want to impeach someone for bad judgment.
On the other hand, the framers did seem to intend that impeachment cover some noncriminal conduct; one could argue that the
ratifiers were familiar with the concept of impeachment for cause
for noncriminal acts.
Finally, I think Professor Rotunda is correct that "crimes
only" impeachment does not really follow from simple construction of the Constitution's language in terms of the "plain English" as spoken and understood at the time the document was
written. This point has also been made by Berger and Simpson. 10
I find particularly interesting Senator McConnell's concerns
about the politicizing of the confirmation hearings. I think it is
fair to say that Senator McConnell thinks that the process got
out of hand during the Bork hearings. 1 On the other hand, a
tour of history is interesting. During the early impeachment
process, Republicans-not GOP Republicans but the folks who
called themselves Republicans way back when Mr. Jefferson was
laying out digs for his basketball team-were toying with the
idea of impeachment for every willful and corrupt act. The

'See P HoFm & N. HtrL, supra note 4.
" U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.
10See R. BERGER, supra note 3; A. SnesoN. supra note 5.
" See supra note 2.
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Republicans thought about expanding impeachment, and the
first thing they did was float a trial balloon styled "popular
will" impeachment. How "democratic"! Iromcally, this sounds
very much like what Congressman (later President) Gerald Ford
was thinking about when he suggested "bad behavior" impeachment for Justice Douglas. Even Jefferson's party gave up on
that idea.
Nevertheless, these "Republicans" were clever devils. They
did not like the Federalists, whom they found elitist and reactionary because the Federalists wrote those nasty Alien and
Sedition Acts and the like. The Republicans tried to use the
Federalist "dangerous tendency" test to impeach Federalist
judges, but this test was also abandoned. We dropped these
theories in the course of the development of congressional impeachment precedent. My point is that there is nothing new
under the sun.
Judge Pickering's case is still on the books, but he was
impeached because he was nuts; Congress did not know what
else to do with him. Moreover, Pickering did not give Congress
any way out. Someone (his son, I think) even showed up and
said that Pickering could not be tried because he was too nuts
to stand trial. Therefore, he should be permitted to remain in
office. Only a lawyer could find merit in that argument. Now
we take care of the incapacity problem through statutory law,
as one of the earlier speakers pointed out. The Pickering case is
not precedent; we are still looking for willful, corrupt, and
serious misconduct, even if the conduct is not criminal.
I agree, both on the basis of construction and precedent,
that "high Crimes and Misdemeanors ' 1 2 must have the same
meamng when we are talking about judges as when we are
talking about the President. Despite the Ford-Douglas incident,
I think that even Congress is capable of stifling its worst instincts. The House of Representatives will limit the reach of
impeachment, for practical reasons if for no other, by turning
to the substantial body of precedent that Professor Rotunda has
collected. Partly for that reason, I lean in favor of Professor
Rotunda's views on judicial review

12

U.S. CONST. art. II,

§ 4.
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I reject the linkage between the "good Behaviour" ianguage
and "high Crimes and Misdemeanors" language 14 for the reasons
Professor Rotunda sets forth. Indeed, the absence of linkage
was admitted in Congress as early as 1802 and again in the early
twentieth century m the Archbald Impeachment. 5
Other issues remain. Professor Rotunda alluded to them this
mormng, and I hope we can twist Professor Rotunda's arm once
more and get him to address these issues in a follow-up article.
The issue of judicial branch policing of bad behavior via statutes
passed pursuant to the necessary and proper clause 6 is among
them. Other issues involve the modification of trial procedures.
This is Senator McConnell's turf. His work in connection with
the Special Committee implemented some sensible ideas. 17 Are
they "constitutional"?
I am less convinced than some of the other Symposium
speakers that judicial branch removal of judges necessarily
threatens the independence of the judiciary, as opposed to the
independence of a particular judge. I had not thought that the
threat to judicial independence is as iron-clad as has been suggested.
In closing, I must say that seeing what happens if the Supreme Court ever reviews a judicial-branch removal statute will
be interesting. I noticed in my readings that an attorney by the
name of William Rehnquist once opined on behalf of the Justice
Department, and before Congress, that judicial-branch removal
would be constitutional. I do not know if he would be of that
nund today as the Chief Justice.
I thank Professor Rotunda for participating and sharing his
scholarship with us. I urge you to explore these issues further.

"1
14

Id. at art. III, § 1.
Id. at art. II, § 4.

11See generally Judge Archbald's Conviction, supra note 6, at 15.
'6 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
" See McConneUl, supra note I at 741-44.

